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Abstract
Background: Mental disorders may be reducible to sets of symptoms, connected through systems of causal relations. A
clinical staging model predicts that in earlier stages of illness, symptom expression is both non-specific and diffuse. With
illness progression, more specific syndromes emerge. This paper addressed the hypothesis that connection strength and
connection variability between mental states differ in the hypothesized direction across different stages of
psychopathology.
Methods: In a general population sample of female siblings (mostly twins), the Experience Sampling Method was used to
collect repeated measures of three momentary mental states (positive affect, negative affect and paranoia). Staging was
operationalized across four levels of increasing severity of psychopathology, based on the total score of the Symptom Check
List. Multilevel random regression was used to calculate inter- and intra-mental state connection strength and connection
variability over time by modelling each momentary mental state at t as a function of the three momentary states at t-1, and
by examining moderation by SCL-severity.
Results: Mental states impacted dynamically on each other over time, in interaction with SCL-severity groups. Thus, SCL-90
severity groups were characterized by progressively greater inter- and intra-mental state connection strength, and greater
inter- and intra-mental state connection variability.
Conclusion: Diagnosis in psychiatry can be described as stages of growing dynamic causal impact of mental states over
time. This system achieves a mode of psychiatric diagnosis that combines nomothetic (group-based classification across
stages) and idiographic (individual-specific psychopathological profiles) components of psychopathology at the level of
momentary mental states impacting on each other over time.
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Introduction
Staging and profiling represent two important aspects of
diagnosis in psychiatry, that recently have become more promi-
nent with the work on the newest edition of the widely used
classification manual for mental disorders, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual for Mental disorders (DSM).
Staging
There is no strong evidence that psychopathology comes as
dichotomous "natural types", separated from mental health by
‘zones of rarity’ [1]. Evidence suggests that mental disorders may
have dimensional representations, extending from stages of mild
behavioural expression of liability in the general population to full-
blown clinical psychopathology [1–5]. However, the dimensional
nature of psychopathology remains to be implemented in
psychiatric nosology.
A major question in the construction of the DSM-V was
whether a new risk syndrome for psychosis should be added [6,7].
However, extending only one of the diagnostic categories into its
prodromal stage would have resulted in an undesired asymmetry
in the diagnostic system, given that all mental disorders have
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precursor risk states, e.g. depression and bipolar disorder [4,8–11],
that furthermore show extensive overlap with each other [12]. As
the early, multidimensional expression of psychopathology is non-
specific, a more efficient, broad general risk syndrome approach
may be required, combining expression of multiple early
manifestations of psychopathology rather than creating specific
per-disorder risk syndromes [12].
The best example of a model that incorporates the concept of
mental illness progressing along stages is the model of clinical
staging [13], that aims to ‘move outside the current diagnostic
boundaries to include the full spectrum of disorder’ [12] and along
dimensional lines links population-level expression of psychopa-
thology to more severe clinical presentations. In the earlier stages
of illness, symptom expression is more diffuse, presenting as a
‘general distress’ syndrome; with progression of illness, psycho-
pathological expression becomes more specific and symptoms
crystallize more into separate (although overlapping) syndromes
[12]. Thus, different stages may be characterized by different
mechanisms underlying expression and development of symptoms.
Profiling
Profiling refers to the tension between the representation of
diagnostic categories as homogenous latent classes, used to cluster
patients (nomothetic approach), and the widespread observation of
heterogeneity between individuals in the same diagnostic class
(idiographic approach) that may be important to predict treatment
response and outcome. Part of the observed heterogeneity may
flow from an incomplete model of psychopathology. For example,
it has been proposed that psychopathology may be best
conceptualized as a dynamic process of symptoms impacting on
each other over time [14–16] rather than as latent structures
underlying a certain set of clinical symptoms [14]. In this view,
mental "disorders" represent sets of symptoms, connected through
a system of causal relations. These associations are thought to
explain the co-occurrence of different symptoms and are
furthermore assumed to span several levels, requiring explanatory
pluralism [17]. To examine the notion of symptoms impacting on
each other dynamically over time, special methodology collecting
frequently repeated measures of mental states underlying symp-
toms is required, for example the Experience Sampling Method
[18].
Combining Staging and Profiling
Describing clinical stages may be considered a nomothetic
component of diagnosis, whereas the unique symptom profile of
patients that move across these classes represents the idiographic
part. Since in the earlier stages of illness, symptom expression is
more diffuse, presenting as a ‘general distress’ syndrome, whereas
with progression of illness, more specific syndromes present
themselves [12], it could be hypothesized that the way symptoms
impact on each other gradually changes, becoming both stronger
and more person-specific with increasing symptom severity.
Specifically, it may be hypothesized that in the early stages of
illness, associations between symptoms are uniformly weak and do
not give rise to high levels of individual-specific profiling in
psychopathology. As individuals progress to more severe stages of
psychopathology, however, individual-specific associations be-
tween symptoms arise, creating a degree of diagnostic divergence
(Fig. 1).
In this paper, we examined the hypothesis that the way in which
momentary mental states indexing positive affect, negative affect
and paranoia impact on each other over time differs across
different stages of severity of psychopathology, in that more severe
stages of psychopathology are characterized by (i) stronger
connections and (ii) more variable connections indicating more
individual-specific associations between the mental states over
time. The three mental states were chosen as they arguably
constitute the core building blocks of an extensive range of
symptoms across mental disorders (depression, bipolar disorder,
psychosis, anxiety). Psychopathology was assessed and classified
across four levels of increasing severity in a general population
sample. In order to examine the mutual impact of mental states
over time, repeated measures of the three states, collected using
the Experience Sampling Method, were used.
We hypothesized that:
(i) Cross-time associations between mental states indexing
positive affect, negative affect and paranoia become stronger
across classes of (staged) severity (nomothetic aspect).
(ii) Inter-individual differences in associations between mental
states increase with increasing symptom severity, evidenced
by an increasing random effect sizes (idiographic aspect).
Methods
Sample
This study is part of a larger longitudinal research project
investigating the heritability of gene-stress interactions in vulner-
ability to depression. Data come from 621 general population
siblings, sampled from the East Flanders Prospective Twin Study
register [19]. The EFPTS is a population-based register, prospec-
tively recording all multiple births in Flanders, Belgium, since
1964. Only women were included in the study, given sex-specific
effects in the expression and aetiology of psychopathology. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Maastricht
University Medical Centre and all participants provided written
informed consent. The sample was assessed at five time points; the
current sample used data from the baseline measurement, when
ESM data were collected (see below). Although most subjects were
twins, the current study did not require specific twin methodology
for analysis.
Instruments
SCL-90. The Symptom Checklist-90-R [20], a reliable and
valid screening self-report instrument for a range of symptoms
occurring in the past week, was used to index the overall severity of
psychopathology with higher scores indicating higher levels of
pathology. The SCL-90 consists of nine subscales (Somatization,
Obsessive-compulsive, Interpersonal-sensitivity, Depression, Anx-
iety, Hostility, Phobic anxiety, Paranoid Ideation and Psychoti-
cism), covering the entire range of psychopathology. The total
score was divided by its quartiles; the resulting four-level variable
(‘SCL-severity’) reflected increasing levels of symptom severity.
ESM. Data was collected using the Experience Sampling
Method, a random time-sampling self-assessment technique that
has been shown to be feasible, valid, and reliable [18,21]. ESM is a
structured diary technique that addresses the daily living
environment of participants. This method has been described in
detail elsewhere [22]. Briefly, participants collected ESM data at
10 random moments on five consecutive days during the day
(between 7.30 am and 13.30 pm), providing a maximum of 50
points per person. The semi-random beep-design prevents
anticipatory behaviour of participants. Participants were asked to
report on thoughts, current context (activity, social context,
location), appraisals of the current situation, and affect. Subjects
with less than 17 valid reports (out of 50) were excluded.
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Three ESM variables reflecting three mental states underlying
symptoms across mental disorders [23] were used: negative affect,
positive affect and paranoia. Adjectives of mental states were rated
by participants on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = ’’not at
all’’ to 7 = ’’very’’. Following earlier work [24], a ‘‘negative affect’’
dimension was constructed based on the mean score of the mood
adjectives ‘‘insecure, lonely, anxious, guilty and down’’ (Cron-
bach’s alpha: 0.76). A ‘‘positive affect’’ dimension was constructed
based on the mean score of the mood adjectives ‘‘happy’’,
‘‘enthusiastic’’, ‘‘energetic’’ and ‘‘satisfied’’ (Cronbach’s alpha:
0.86). Consistent with earlier work [25], a paranoia score was
based on the ESM item ‘‘I feel suspicious’’, was constructed, also
rated on a 7-point Likert scale.
SCID. The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I
disorders [26] was administered by trained psychologists to assess
levels of clinical symptoms. Subscales of depression, hallucinations
and delusions were used for the current study.
GAF. A Global Assessment of Functioning score was rated
for each participant by an interviewer with a mental health-
related profession. The GAF scale has a 100-point range
indexing overall mental, social, and occupational functioning of
adult individuals. The version with two separate scores was
used: a symptom score and a handicap score. Higher scores
indicate better functioning.
Physical and mental health. Individuals subjectively rated
their physical and mental health on a 5-point scale. These
variables were recoded into a dichotomous variable, reflecting
good (excellent, very good, good) health versus bad (moderate,
poor) health.
Figure 1. Visual representation of dynamics between mental states with increasing levels of psychopathological severity. Depicted is
a hypothesized circuit between 6 mental states across different stages of severity. The connections represent the impact of one mental state at time
point t-1 on another mental state at time-point t. The impact of a mental state on itself from t-1 to t is the intra-mental state connection. In the
earliest stage, inter and intra-mental state connections are uniformly weak (top; dotted lines). In the next stage, inter- and intra-mental state
connections not only get stronger (middle; solid lines), but there are also more differences between persons with regard to which connections get
stronger (person on the left strongest connections on the right side of the circuit, person on the right strongest connections on the left side of the
circuit), i.e. there is more profiling. In the most severe stage of psychopathology, mental state connections are growing even stronger (bottom; bold/
dotted lines) and more variable across persons. The increased variability in connection strength can be quantified by the random effect from the
multilevel random regression model. Thus, staging is represented in this figure by increasing severity of psychopathology, reflected by more powerful
connections between mental states impacting on each other, and profiling is represented by the gradual differentiation of syndromes (indicated by
different colours) with increasing levels of psychopathological severity. Based on: Epskamp, S., Cramer, A. O. J., Waldorp, L. J., Schmittmann, V. D. &
Borsboom, D. (2012). Qgraph: Network visualizations of relationships in psychometric data. Journal of Statistical Software, 48, 1–18.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059559.g001
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Statistical Analyses
All analyses were carried out using STATA 12. The validity of
the assumption that the SCL-severity variable represented staged
levels of psychopathology and need for care was first investigated.
Thus, the four SCL-severity groups were compared in relation to the
sum score of the depression, hallucination and delusion subscales
of the SCID. Similarly, the four SCL-severity groups were compared
in relation to (i) GAF-symptom and GAF-handicap scores and (ii)
subjective ratings of both physical and mental health.
ESM data consist of multiple mental state observations per day,
over multiple days, in each person. Analyses were controlled for
clustering of data within persons, who, in turn, were clustered
within families. As we had no hypothesis regarding genetic effects
on transfer of momentary mental states, we did not differentiate
between monozygotic and dizygotic twins.
To examine the dynamic impact of the mental states of positive
affect, negative affect and paranoia on each other over time, time-
lagged variables were used in multilevel random regression
models: negative affect at t was predicted by (i) negative affect,
(ii) positive affect and (iii) paranoia, all at t-1. The same was done
for positive affect at t and paranoia at t. Thus, all ESM mental
state variables at t were predicted by all mental state variables at t-
1. Each of these analyses was carried out separately in order to
enable model convergence.
Staging. To examine whether the strength of the associations
between mental states over time differed as a function of stages of
symptom severity (staging), interactions between mental states (e.g.
negative affect at t-1) and the four-level SCL-severity variable were
fitted in the model predicting the mental state outcome variable
(e.g. paranoia at t). Using the LINCOM command, regression
coefficients (B) were calculated for each SCL-severity group
separately. These regression coefficients represent the fixed effects
that refer to patterns across groups (i.e. different stages).
Profiling. To examine whether more advanced stages of
severity of psychopathology were associated with greater level of
individual-specific patterns of mental states impacting on each
other (profiling), random slopes of mental state predictors at t-1
were investigated in the time-lagged analyses described above.
These random slopes reflect the assumption that the effect of
mental states at t-1 predicting mental states at t varies randomly
across individuals. Random slope effects were estimated for each
SCL-severity level to examine the hypothesis of more individual-
specific patterns of symptoms impacting on each other with
greater levels of psychopathological severity. Additionally, the
significance of these differences in random effects was assessed
with a simple individual-level linear regression model (SCL-
severity group as independent variable and the estimated random




Of the 621 subjects, 610 participated in the ESM study. Thirty-
one participants were excluded because of too little (,30%) valid
data points, leaving 579 individuals with data on paranoia and
negative affect (268 monozygotic twins, 266 dizygotic twins and 45
non-twin sisters). Data on positive affect was available for 567
individuals. Subjects were aged between 18–61 years (mean age
27.7 (SD 7.9) years). The majority (64%) had a college/university
degree, were in a relationship (76%) and employed (62%) or
studying (36%) at baseline. Mean level of NA was 1.27 (SD 0.37),
of PA 4.43 (SD 0.86), and of momentary paranoia 1.16 (SD 0.33).
Validation of the SCL-severity Variable
The four SCL-severity groups differed in mean levels of delusional
ideation (F(3,22672) = 353.3; p,0.001), hallucinatory experiences
(F(3,22641) = 145.0; p,0.001) and depression
(F(3,22641) = 1800.0; p,0.001). The SCL-severity groups similarly
differed in GAF symptom score (F(3,22491) = 1157.9; p,0.001),
GAF handicap score (F(3,22449) = 1185.0; p,0.001) and in level
of physical (x2(3) = 25000; p,0.001) and mental health
(x2(3) = 42000; p,0.001). Dose-response relations were apparent
(Table 1). Thus, the four groups of the SCL-severity variable reflect
staged levels of symptom severity and impairment.
Mental States Connection Strength at Different Stages of
Symptom Severity
Significant interactions were found between SCL-severity and (i)
negative affect at t-1 (Z = 9.02; p,0.001), (ii) positive affect at t-1
(Z =212.91; p,0.001) and (iii) paranoia at t-1 (Z = 4.18; p,0.001)
predicting negative affect at t (Table 2). Similarly, significant
interactions were found between SCL-severity and (i) negative affect
at t-1 (Z = 5.54; p,0.001), (ii) positive affect at t-1 (Z =25.39;
p,0.001) and (iii) paranoia at t-1 (Z = 7.26; p,0.001) predicting
paranoia at t. No significant interactions were found between SCL-
severity and (i) negative affect at t-1 (Z =21.41; p = 0.160), (ii)
positive affect at t-1 (Z =20.64; p = 0.522), or (iii) paranoia
(Z =21.02; p = 0.307) at t-1 predicting positive affect at t. The
significant interactions are displayed in Figure 2, as well as the
progressively stronger effect sizes of mental states at t-1 impacting
on mental states at t across the four levels of the SCL-severity
variable. Thus, mental states at t-1 (and in particular negative
mental states such as negative affect and paranoia) predict mental
states at t, suggesting transfer of momentary mental states. This
transfer becomes increasingly stronger with increasing symptom
severity. This transfer is seen within each mental state (e.g.,
negative affect at t-1 predicts negative affect at t) and across mental
states (e.g., negative affect at t-1 predicts paranoia at t).
Table 1. Validation of the four quartile groups of the SCL-90
total score as representing increasing levels of symptom
severity.
SCL-severity level
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
GAF symptom score (mean, SD) 92.4 (5.0) 90.9 (6.0) 88.5 (8.0) 84.3 (11.4)
GAF handicap score (mean, SD) 92.8 (5.0) 91.6 (5.4) 89.9 (6.1) 85.5 (10.3)
Physical health (%)
Excellent/very good/good 98% 93% 79% 69%
Moderate/poor 2% 7% 21% 31%
Mental health (%)
Excellent/very good/good 100% 96% 85% 61%
Moderate/poor 0% 4% 15% 39%
SCID delusion score (mean, SD) 0.0 (0.2) 0.1 (0.4) 0.2 (0.5) 0.3 (0.6)
SCID hallucination score (mean, SD)0 (0) 0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.4)
SCID depression score (mean, SD) 0.6 (0.9) 1.2 (1.2) 1.4 (1.6) 2.7 (2.2)
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Random Effects at Different Stages of Symptom Severity
Random slope effects were examined for the above models with
a significant interaction between SCL-severity and mental state at t-1
(i.e. in the models predicting negative affect and paranoia at t).
Random slope effects were found to be increasing with increasing
levels of SCL-severity. These patterns were most clear for negative
affect and paranoia (Table 3); random slope effects of positive
affect at moment t-1 predicting (i) negative affect at moment t or (ii)
paranoia at moment t were very small. Again, a dose-response was
apparent, in that random effects were smallest in the lowest SCL-
severity group of SCL-severity and largest in the highest SCL-severity
group. Thus, larger random effects in the higher SCL-severity
groups reflect more individual effects, suggesting more profiling
with increasing symptom severity.
The linear regression analysis predicting the random effects with
SCL-severity as independent variable showed that this increase of
random effects over the SCL-severity groups (i.e. with increasing
symptom severity) was significant for negative affect at t-1
(B = 0.06, 95% CI 0.05, 0.07, p,0.001) and paranoia at moment
t-1 (B = 0.02, 95% CI 0.02, 0.03, p,0.001) but not for positive
affect at moment t-1 (B = 0.00, 95% CI 0.00, 0.00, p,0.138),
predicting negative affect at t. Similarly, this increase of random
effects over the SCL-severity groups was significant for negative
affect at t-1 (B = 0.04, 95% CI 0.03, 0.06, p,0.001) and paranoia
at moment t-1 (B = 0.02, 95% CI 0.01, 0.03, p,0.001) predicting
paranoia at t. There was too little variation in the slope of positive
affect at t-1 predicting paranoia at t to predict this based on the
SCL-severity variable using linear regression.
Discussion
Mental states indexing momentary positive affect, negative
affect and paranoia impacted dynamically on each other over
time, and dynamics changed with increasing stages of psycho-
pathological severity in a general population sample of female
twins. It was shown that more severe stages of psychopathology are
characterized by (i) stronger and (ii) more variable and hence
individual-specific inter- and intra-mental state connections over
time.
Figure 2. Increasing strength of symptom dynamics with increasing SCL-severity. At the lowest level of SCL-severity (level 1), the
regression coefficients of mental states at t-1 predicting mental states at t are weakest. The strength of these regression coefficients increases in a
dose-response fashion with increasing SCL-severity and are strongest at the highest SCL-severity level (level 4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059559.g002
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Table 2. Negative affect, positive affect and paranoia at moment t predicted by mental states at moment t-1, by SCL-severity.
Negative affect at moment t predicted by mental states at moment t-1, by SCL-severity
SCL-Severity Negative affect at t-1 Positive affect at t-1 Paranoia at t-1
Symptom severity – level 1 0.29 (0.24, 0.33)* 20.03 (20.04, 0.01)* 0.12 (0.08, 0.16)*
Symptom severity – level 2 0.34 (0.30, 0.37)* 20.05 (20.07, 20.04)* 0.09 (0.06, 0.12)*
Symptom severity – level 3 0.39 (0.36, 0.41)* 20.10 (20.12, 20.09)* 0.11 (0.08, 0.14)*
Symptom severity – level 4 0.47 (0.45, 0.49)* 20.16 (20.17, 20.14)* 0.17 (0.16, 0.19)*
Positive affect at moment t predicted by mental states at moment t-1, by SCL-severity
Symptom severity – level 1 20.26 (20.35, 20.17)* 0.43 (0.41, 0.46)* 20.01 (20.08, 0.06)
Symptom severity – level 2 20.33 (20.40, 20.25)* 0.42 (0.39, 0.45)* 20.10 (20.17, 20.04)*
Symptom severity – level 3 20.32 (20.38, 20.26)* 0.40 (0.37, 0.43)* 20.10 (20.15, 20.05)*
Symptom severity – level 4 20.34 (20.39, 20.30)* 0.42 (0.40, 0.45)* 20.08 (20.12, 20.04)*
Paranoia at moment t predicted by mental states at moment t-1, by SCL-severity
Symptom severity – level 1 0.01 (20.05, 0.06) 0.01 (0.00, 0.03) 0.15 (0.11, 0.19)*
Symptom severity – level 2 0.16 (0.12, 0.21)* 20.01 (20.03, 0.00) 0.10 (0.06, 0.14)*
Symptom severity – level 3 0.13 (0.10, 0.17)* 20.02 (20.03, 0.00) 0.16 (0.13, 0.19)*
Symptom severity – level 4 0.19 (0.17, 0.22)* 20.05 (20.07, 20.04)* 0.26 (0.24, 0.28)*
*p,0.05.
Negative affect: In individuals at the lowest symptom severity level (level 1), negative affect at t-1 predicts negative affect at t. This association between mental states
at two subsequent time points becomes stronger (i.e. there is more transfer) with increasing symptom severity level in a dose-response fashion: this association is
strongest at the highest symptom severity level (level 4). Similarly, paranoia affect at t-1 predicts negative affect at t, and this association also becomes stronger with
increasing symptom severity strength, again suggesting more transfer of mental states with increasing symptom severity. Positive affect at t-1 predicts negative affect at
t also with increasing strength, indicating that the lower level of positive affect, the higher the level of negative affect will be, and, given the progressive strength of the
association, more transfer of mental states with increasing symptom severity is again suggested.
Positive affect: No significant interaction was found for SCL-symptom severity level and mental states at t-1 predicting mental states at t. This is reflected by the fact
that there is no clear increase in strength of associations with increasing severity level.
Paranoia: In individuals at the lowest symptom severity level (level 1), paranoia at t21 predicts paranoia at t. This association between mental states at two subsequent
time points becomes stronger (i.e. there is more transfer) with increasing symptom severity level in a dose-response fashion: this association is strongest at the highest
symptom severity level (level 4). Similarly, negative affect at t21 predicts paranoia at t, and this association also becomes stronger with increasing symptom severity
strength, again suggesting more transfer of mental states with increasing symptom severity. Positive affect at t21 predicts paranoia at t also with increasing strength,
indicating that the lower level of positive affect, the higher the level of paranoia will be, and, given the progressive strength of the association, more transfer of mental
states with increasing symptom severity is again suggested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059559.t002
Table 3. Random slope effects in models predicting negative affect and paranoia, by SCL-severity.
Random slope effects in models predicting negative affect, by SCL-severity
SCL-severity Negative affect at t-1 Positive affect at t-1 Paranoia at t-1
Symptom severity – level 1 0.09 (0.08, 0.10)* 0.02 (0.01, 0.03)* 0.10 (0.08, 0.12)*
Symptom severity – level 2 0.10 (0.08, 0.12)* 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.08 (0.06, 0.11)*
Symptom severity – level 3 0.11 (0.09, 0.13)* 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.15 (0.12, 0.19)*
Symptom severity – level 4 0.14 (0.11, 0.17)* 0.05 (0.03, 0.08)* 0.15 (0.11, 0.20)*
Random slope effects in models predicting paranoia, by SCL-severity
Symptom severity – level 1 0.05 (0.03, 0.10)* 0.04 (0.03, 0.04)* 0.10 (0.08, 0.12)*
Symptom severity – level 2 0.11 (0.09, 0.13)* 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.09 (0.07, 0.12)*
Symptom severity – level 3 0.12 (0.10, 0.15)* 0.01 (0.00, 3.60) 0.14 (0.11, 0.17)*
Symptom severity – level 4 0.20 (0.17, 0.24)* 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.19 (0.15,0.25)*
*p,0.05.
The random slope effects reflect variation at the individual level. Thus, the more random effects, the more individual variation is present.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059559.t003
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A Novel Diagnostic System Based on Staging and
Profiling?
The results suggest that as individuals move through progressive
stages of psychopathological severity as described in the clinical
staging model [27], two processes mediate mental health
parameters. First, the dynamics between different mental states
become increasingly stronger, indicated by the increasing strength
of the regression coefficients of mental states at t-1 predicting
mental states at t over the progressive severity stages. Second, the
differences between individuals become progressively larger, as
indicated by the increasing random slope effects over the
progressive severity stages. The first pattern reflects the nomothetic
process of staging (progressing through increasingly severe
expression of mental ill-health) and the second refers to the
idiographic concept of profiling (the increase of inter-individual
differences that underlie diagnosable heterogeneity in the expres-
sion of psychopathology in clinical populations).
One of the key notions of the clinical staging model is that
mental distress and need for care are present long before possible
assignment of a clinical diagnosis [12,27]. As generally recognized,
clinical diagnostic classification systems such as the DSM are
almost exclusively based on patients whose psychopathology
represent the most severe manifestations of mental ill-health
[28,29]. A model of clinical staging acknowledges a need, and a
possibility, to intervene before reaching this phase in the course of
illness. Therefore, an alternative diagnostic system allowing for
flexible operationalization of the nomothetic and idiographic
aspects of psychopathology may be productive in this regard. The
current study shows that in the context of early diagnosis,
nomothetic and idiographic components of psychopathology can
be combined, based on the changing dynamics of associations
between mental states, in particular negative mental states such as
negative affect and paranoia across individuals, and the increasing
heterogeneity between individuals, reflected in increasing random
(i.e. individual) effects.
Momentary Mental States, Symptoms and Diagnosis
The symptom measures analysed in the current paper represent
mental states indexing momentary positive affect, negative affect
and paranoia in daily life. These mental states were measured in
the general, mostly non-clinical population, and reflect subclinical,
low-level expression of mental ill-health. The dynamics between
these mental states may form the building blocks of observable
symptoms of mental ill-health and are thus relevant in the context
of early diagnosis since it allows for investigation the development
of psychopathology arising from its earliest sub-symptomatic
expressions.
The rationale explored in this study could be extended to the
hypothesis that dynamic patterns can also be observed in actual
symptoms impacting on each other [14–16]. This could be an
important and useful addition to the paradigm explored in the
current study, complementing the current focus on micro-level
momentary mental states with one at the macro-level of symptoms
as proposed recently [16]. It is increasingly recognized that
symptoms of psychopathology can be described as dynamic
networks, or circuits, impacting on each other and crossing
diagnostic boundaries [14–16]. This hypothesis would be of
interest to address in the context of clinical staging, given that
staging transgresses diagnostic boundaries [12], and broadly
encompasses first expression of mental ill-health in general [27].
The fact that the momentary mental states addressed in the
current study have been shown to be relevant in the context of
both depression [30] and psychosis [31] supports a spectrum-
broad approach: it suggests that emotional dysregulation and
psychosis share etiological overlap in their early, non-specific
phases of expression and that during the development of more
pathological stages, more specific psychopathological profiles arise,
based on differentiation of dynamics between mental states [32–
35].
Non-linearity Across Stages
When investigating dynamics between mental states (micro-
level) or symptoms (macro-level) in the context of development of
need for care, the dynamic nature of associations should be taken
into account. When moving across the spectrum of psychopath-
ological severity, certain factors of risk or resilience may impact
differently at different stages [27], as has recently been shown in
the context of psychosis [36]. Also, intermediate phenotypes such
as cognitive alterations may show a non-linear pattern of
association with expression of psychosis across the full spectrum
of the extended psychosis phenotype [37]. Furthermore, non-
linear associations also apply to other domains of psychopathol-
ogy, such as the association between dysregulation of the HPA-axis
and depression [38]. This area needs further investigation in future
research.
Random effects of positive affect at t-1 predicting both negative
affect and paranoia at t, reflecting individual variation in these
associations, were quite small. Thus, effects of positive affect do not
differ much between individuals, and these small differences did
not change much with increasing symptom severity. Thus, effects
of positive affect on negative affect and paranoia are quite similar
for all individuals, suggesting interventions that focus on (increas-
ing) positive affect, e.g. mindfulness based interventions [39], that
can be implemented relatively easily, may be helpful, independent
of diagnosis or symptom severity.
Strengths and Limitations
An important strength of this study is that it introduces an
element of diagnostic novelty, aiming to investigate the develop-
ment of psychopathology from an entirely new perspective:
exploring the dynamics between mental states in individuals with
increasing levels of psychopathology. As this is a first, exploratory
step in this direction, replication of our findings in other samples is
necessary.
It is important to keep in mind that the current sample is a
general population sample, in which the expected prevalence of
significant psychopathology is around 15–20% [40]. However,
mental ill-health is not dichotomous, it is continuously distributed
throughout the population [41–43], reflecting, at least to a degree,
underlying dynamic transitions from one stage to another. The
topic of the current paper pertains to longitudinal plasticity of
psychopathology, but was examined by analysing a cross-sectional
convenience sample. The approach was to analyse between-person
differences in severity as a proxy of within-person longitudinal
change. The underlying assumptions are that (i) differences in
severity of psychopathology in the population reflect, at least to a
degree, differences in dynamic transitional trajectories of each
participant, rather than differences that are completely stable over
the lifetime, and (ii) a random cross-section of the population will
contain individuals across the different stages of psychopathology.
While this assumption has some face validity, and may be
considered suitable for proof-of-principle as demonstrated in the
current study, the specific relevance of the present results for the
clinical staging model should be considered tentative until
replicated in a longitudinal within-person design. Generalization
of the current findings should furthermore be conservative, since
twins may differ in crucial aspects from the general population.
Furthermore, twins were all female, and relatively highly educated.
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Future research could extend the line of research explored in
the current study with a focus on dynamic relationships between
symptoms, comparing dynamics between mental states and/or
symptoms across different stages and syndromes to explore and
compare possible disorder-specific patterns. Ideally, samples
should be used with differential clinical severity patterns,
representing multiple clinical stages. Also, studies should ideally
include a longitudinal dimension, following individuals over time,
to investigate the transition from one stage to another. Further-
more, factors of risk and resilience that may impact on mental
state and symptom dynamics, and on progression through
successive clinical stages, plus their susceptibility to early
interventions [44], should be studied in the future.
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